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ABSTRACT 
Mobile   IP   is   an   open   standard,   defined   by   the   Internet   
Engineering   Task   Force (IETF) RFC 3220. By using Mobile 
IP, you can keep the same IP address, stay connected, and   
maintain   ongoing   applications   while   roaming   between   IP   
networks.   Mobile   IP   is scalable   for   the   Internet   because   
it   is   based   on   IP—any   media   that   can   support   IP   can 
support Mobile IP.   
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In IP networks, routing is based on stationary IP addresses, 
similar to how a postal letter is delivered to a fixed address on an 
envelope. A device on a network is reachable through normal IP 
routing by the IP address it is assigned on the network.   
However, problems occur when a device roams away from its 
home network and is no longer reachable using normal IP routing. 
This causes the active sessions of the device to be terminated. 
Mobile IP enables users to keep the same IP address while 
traveling to a different network (which may even be operated by a 
different wireless operator), thus ensuring that a roaming 
individual can continue communication without sessions or 
connections being dropped. 
Because the mobility functions of Mobile IP are performed at the 
network layer rather than the physical layer, the mobile device can 
span different types of wireless and wire line networks while 
maintaining connections and ongoing applications. Remote login, 
remote printing, and file transfers are examples of applications 
where it is undesirable to interrupt communications while an 
individual roams across network boundaries. Furthermore, certain 
network services, such as software licenses and access privileges, 
are based on IP addresses. Changing these IP addresses can 
compromise the network services. 
 
II. THE NEED FOR MOBILE IP 
It has been foreseen that mobile computing devices will become 
more pervasive, more useful, and more powerful in the future. The 
power and usefulness will come from being able to extend and 
integrate the functionality of all types of communication such as 
Web browsing, e-mail, phone calls, information retrieval, and 
perhaps even video transmission. For Mobile IP computing to 
become as pervasive as stationary IP networks of the world, a 
ubiquitous protocol for the integration of voice, video, and data 
must be developed. The most widely researched and developed 
protocol is Mobile IP.   
The advantages of using Mobile IP can be summarized as follows:   
+ It follows fast, continuous low-cost access to corporate 
networks in remote areas where there is no public telephone 
system or cellular coverage.   
+ It supports a widely range of applications from Internet access 
and e-mail to e-commerce.   
+ Users can be permanently connected to their Internet provider 
and charged only for the data packets that are sent and received.   
+ Lower equipment and utilization costs for those requiring 
reliable high-speed data connections in remote locations 
worldwide.   
+ A user can take a palmtop or laptop computer anywhere without 
losing the connection to the home network.   
+ Mobile IP finds local IP routers and connections automatically. 
It is phone-jack and wire-free.   
+ Other than mobile nodes/routers, the remaining routers and 
hosts will still use current IP. Mobile IP leaves transport and 
higher protocols unaffected.   
+ Authentication is performed to ensure that rights are being 
protected.   
+ Mobile IP can move from one type of medium to another 
without losing connectivity. It is unique in its ability to 
accommodate heterogeneous mobility in addition to homogeneous 
mobility. 
The Mobile IP network is also characterized by some 
disadvantages as well:   
+ There is a routing inefficiency problem caused by the “triangle 
routing” formed by the home agent, correspond to host, and the 
foreign agent. It is hoped Mobile IPv6 can solve the problem.   
+ Security risks are the most important problem facing Mobile IP. 
Besides the tradition security risks with IP, one has to worry about 
faked care-of addresses.   
By obtaining the mobile host’s care-of address and rerouting the 
data to itself, an attacker can obtain unauthorized information. 
However, another issue related to the security is how to make 
Mobile IP coexist with the security features coming in use within 
the Internet.   
The characteristics that should be considered as baseline 
requirements to be satisfied by any candidate for Mobile IP are 
the following:     
+ Compatibility: A new standard cannot require changes for 
applications or network protocols already in use. Mobile IP has to 
remain compatible to all lower layers used for the standard non-
mobile IP. It must not require special media or protocol.   
+ Transparency: Mobility should remain “invisible” for many 
higher layers protocols and applications. Besides maybe noticing 
a lower bandwidth and some interruption in service, higher layers 
should continue to work, even if the mobile changed its point of 
attachment to the network.   
+ Scalability and efficiency: Introducing a new mechanism into 
the Internet must not degrade the efficiency of the network. Due 
to the growth rates of mobile communication, clearly  Mobile IP 
must be scalable over a large number of participants in the whole 
Internet. 
+ Security: All messages used to transmit information to another 
node about the location of a mobile node must be authentication 
to protect against remote redirection attacks.   
The requirements of Mobile IP may be summarized as follows:   
+ A mobile node must be able to communicate with other nodes 
after changing its link-layer point of attachment to the Internet, yet 
without changing its IP address.   
+ Application programs must be able to operate continuously over 
a single session while the network attachment point of the mobile 
host changes.   
+ A mobile node must be able to communicate with other nodes 
that do not implement these mobility functions.   
+ All messages used to update another node with the location of a 
mobile node must be authenticated in order to protect against 
redirection attacks. 
 
III. PROTOCOL AUTHENTICATION EXTENSION   
In a routing protocol, it is important for peers to trust one another 
and to ensure that the messages they exchange have not been 
altered in transit. False routing updates from un-trusted peers or 
altered updates from trusted peers can wreak havoc on a network, 
for example, causing traffic for multiple prefixes to be routed 
incorrectly or even black holed.  
 The Mobile IP protocol uses security authentication extensions to 
provide peer authentication and message integrity. As the name 
suggests, the authentication extension is an extension containing 
relevant security information that is appended to the end of the 
message. The authentication extensions are designed to allow 
extensive flexibility through their extension type and placement 
within the message. That is, different types of authentication 
extension's secure messages between different Mobile IP entities.   
Moreover, the authentication extensions secure a specific part of 
the Mobile IP messages, depending on where the part is placed 
within the message. 
The critical purpose of the authentication extension is to verify the 
sender of the message and to ensure that the message was not 
altered while in transit. The extension types are allocated to allow 
authentication between various pairs of peers. The following four 
Mobile IP extension types, allocated for authentication, currently 
exist:   
+ Mobile Node - Home Agent Authentication Extension – 
MHAE.   
+ Mobile Node - FA Authentication Extension – MFAE.   
+ FA - Home Agent Authentication Extension – FHAE.   
+ Generalized Authentication Extension – GNAE.   
Authentication extensions allow flexibility in authenticating 
various parts of the registration message with various peers. Thus, 
as information is added to the registration control messages, it can 
be protected without altering the protection to pre-existing 
portions of the control message. For example, a Mobile Node can 
secure its RRQ with an MHAE and forward the request to its FA. 
The MHAE protects the information preceding it, namely, the 
base RRQ. In turn, the FA might want to append an extension to 
the RRQ and secure the extension with an FHAE. The two 
extensions secure different subsets of the message and are 
between different Mobile IP entity pairs. That is, the base RRQ is 
secured between the Mobile Node and Home Agent, and the 
entire message, including the appended extension, is secured 
between the FA and Home Agent.   
3.1. Security Associations   
For Mobile IP entities to use an authentication extension between 
them, they must first share a security relationship. This 
relationship is in the form of a set of predefined parameters 
configured into each node, which are collectively known as a 
security context. A security context is comprised of the following 
components:   
+ Algorithm and mode to be used in crypto computations.   
+ Shared key between the peers.   
+ Replay protection method.   
Theoretically, each node can have more than 4 billion individual 
security contexts per peer. A group of one or more security 
contexts that are shared with an individual peer is referred to as a 
security association. It is also common for the term security 
association to be used interchangeably with the term security 
context. This is likely because security associations are often 
made up of only one security context.   
The sender computes a cryptographic keyed hash of the message 
using an algorithm and shared key, places this value in the 
authentication field of the authentication extension, and sends the 
message. The algorithm and keys that protect a message are 
implied by the sender within the authentication extension, which 
is part of the protected portion of the message. To verify the 
integrity of a message, the recipient computes its own 
cryptographic keyed hash of the same portion of the message (the 
message not including the authenticator value) using the same 
algorithm and shared key.   
It then compares the computed hash to the authenticator value in 
the appropriate authentication extension. If the two match, the 
message is considered to be authenticated.   
 3.2. SPI   
A specific security context is identified in the authentication 
extension by the security parameter index (SPI) value. The SPI is 
a 4-byte value that is configured as either a hexadecimal or 
decimal value. (Unfortunately, this can often lead to confusion 
because the peer devices can require the SPI value to be specified 
in different formats.) If a security violation is received on a RRQ, 
the SPI value is the first item that should be verified, because it 
identifies the security context to use in authenticating the 
message.   
3.3. Algorithm and Mode   
The authenticator value in the authentication extension is a 
message authentication code (MAC), which can be thought of as a 
fingerprint. For each registration message, a hash algorithm 
calculates the unique fingerprint value, which is of smaller total 
length than the original message. Thus, given that more possible 
values exist for the original message than do unique fingerprint 
results, the algorithms are designed so that the result is as unique 
as possible. The ideal algorithm results in 50 percent of the bits in 
the hash changing by changing just 1 bit in the message.   
3.4. Key   
The authenticator is computed using a key that is shared between 
the two peers. The node that initiates the message uses the key to 
compute the value in the authentication extension. The node that 
receives the message uses the same key value and computes the 
authenticator over the registration message and compares the 
result to the value in the authentication extension. If the two 
values match, the authentication is accepted. The default key is 
128 bits long and is usually represented by 32 hex characters.   
RFC 3344, "IP Mobility Support for IPv4," states the following:   
The default algorithm is HMAC-MD5 [23], with a key size of 128 
bits. The FA MUST also support authentication using HMAC-
MD5 and key sizes of 128 bits or greater, with manual key 
distribution. Keys with arbitrary binary values MUST be 
supported. 
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